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WALKING THE WALK OF PLAIN TEXT: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
MARKEDLY MORE SOLICITOUS TREATMENT OF TITLE VII 
FOLLOWING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR.* 
There is a great deal to celebrate on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary 
of Title VII.1  Professor Days and the respondent participants collectively 
recount the positive differences that Title VII has made in the lives of ordinary 
Americans.  Its influence, however, goes well beyond labor statistics.  Unlike 
the Depression-era legislation regulating wages and hours, Title VII addressed 
not merely the terms and conditions of employment; it has shaped the very 
composition of the work force.  Its prohibitions on race, gender, and national 
origin discrimination in particular have brought significant numbers of 
different kinds of people into proximity and partnership with one another for 
the first time in our history.  Because Americans spend so much of their time at 
work, it may even be plausibly claimed that no other twentieth-century statute 
can match Title VII’s impact on general societal attitudes and culture. 
There is also genuine ground for regret.  The statute has only partially and 
fitfully fulfilled its promise.  Like any other statute, Title VII means what 
judges say it means. As Judge Mary L. Dudziak wrote in a response to last 
year’s Childress Lecture, “[u]nderstanding the contingency . . . in the act of 
judging keeps us vigilant about one of the most contingent of judicial 
variables . . . —which judges happen to be on the train.”2  From its effective 
date of July 2, 1965, until roughly 1977, when the Supreme Court decided 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,3 federal judges were 
in full missionary mode, construing Title VII’s substantive prohibitions and 
remedies expansively while relaxing its procedural requirements. Thereafter, 
and culminating in the notorious 1989 trilogy of decisions construing Title VII 
 
* Walter F. George Professor of Law, Mercer University. A.B. Columbia 1969; J.D. Stanford 
1972.  The author is grateful for the support of the Walter F. George Foundation, Mercer Law 
School, and Dean Daisy Hurst Floyd. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). 
 2. Mary L. Dudziak, Brown and the Idea of Progress in American Legal History: A 
Comment on William Nelson, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 851, 857 (2004). 
 3. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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and § 1981,4 the Court embarked on a period of restriction, retrenchment, and 
restoration of traditional managerial prerogatives.5  Although it began before 
the new Reagan appointees assumed places on the Court,6 their arrival 
certainly accelerated the trend. 
Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1991,7 which 
accomplished the following: (1) reinvigorated Title VII’s mainstay claim of 
individual disparate treatment; (2) formally endorsed, but somewhat tepidly 
implemented, claims asserting that neutral practices have a disproportionate 
adverse impact on groups protected by the statute; (3) fundamentally 
reinvigorated § 1981 claims alleging intentional race discrimination in 
employment; and (4) failed to address the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”)8 or to revive constitutional claims under § 1983 that had been 
under steady assault since 1984 when the Court began reformulating and 
expanding the government officer’s defense of qualified immunity.9  Since 
1991, the federal district bench has by all accounts become even more 
conservative, and therefore presumptively even more sympathetic to 
management.10  At the same time, however, the Supreme Court, purporting to 
adhere to traditional judicial values, has frequently, loudly, and controversially 
trumpeted its fidelity to “plain text.”11  After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
 
 4. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 5. Some scholars have dated this retrenchment to the “late 1970s,” citing some 
developments in 1976 and others occurring after 1978.  See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, 
Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII 
Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1082, 1094–95 (1992). 
 6. The new conservative approach to discrimination “occurred among judges of all political 
affiliations.”  Id. at 1180. After an initial decade of stringent enforcement of Title VII, “federal 
judges apparently began to share the general public’s belief that employment discrimination 
against minorities had been largely eradicated.”  Id. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 
(2000)). 
 9. I have elsewhere discussed in more detail the scope and extent of the 1991 Act’s reversal 
of the restrictive employment discrimination decisions of the late 1970s and 1980s.  See generally 
Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Continued Dominance of the Disparate 
Treatment Conception of Equality, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
 10. It has been reported, for example, that in the 1990s more than half the sitting federal 
bench had been appointed by President Reagan or the first President Bush.  See KATHERINE 
YURICA, THE NEW MESSIAHS, at www.yuricareport.com/Art%20Essays/The%20New%2020 
Messiahs%20Excerpts.htm; Michael Fumento, A Lot Riding on the Federal Bench: Clinton Win 
Could Derail Conservative Dominance, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Sept. 30, 1993, at 
http://www.fumento.com/federalbench.html. 
 11. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 
1603(b)(2) based on the plain text of the statute); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 
344, 356 (2000) (rejecting an interpretation of 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) because it “contradict[ed] 
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1991, then, have federal judges continued to indulge, or indulge to the same 
degree, their personal preferences for employers, despite the generally pro-
employee tenor of that law?  Or have they been largely obedient to the 
apparent intention underlying the Congressional intervention, putting their own 
preferences to one side? 
An appraisal of the federal courts’ reaction to the 1991 Amendments to 
Title VII and § 1981 strongly suggests that Congressional intervention has 
made a distinct, durable difference.  In the ensuing thirteen years, the Court has 
charted an interpretive course that may best be described as moderately 
facilitative of disparate treatment claims under both statutes.  In marked, 
instructive contrast, the Court has continued to follow its own evident 
preferences by eviscerating the effectiveness of § 1983 and somewhat sapping 
the vitality of the ADEA.  The heartening conclusion is that the federal bench, 
and especially the Supreme Court, has indeed walked the walk of plain 
statutory text when Congress has plainly expressed its displeasure with the 
course of the Court’s decisions.  This conclusion is if anything fortified by the 
contrary example of the Court’s chary and hostile constructions of, 
respectively, the ADEA and § 1983, statutes that were not defended from 
judicial incursion by a Congressional counterweight. The balance of this essay 
will sketch signal decisional developments that illustrate and support these 
conclusions. 
The 1991 Act amended Title VII to authorize, for the first time, 
compensatory and punitive damages.12  In a related constitutional context, the 
Court has shown it is no friend of outsize punitive awards, placing Due Process 
limits on punitive awards.13  Yet just three years after Gore, in Kolstad v. 
American Dental Association, the Court adopted a traditional, moderate 
standard governing the recovery of punitive damages for Title VII actions.14  
The Court left undisturbed numerous lower court decisions approving the 
award of emotional distress damages based solely on the plaintiff’s own 
testimony.15  The Court also strengthened Congress’s express authorization of 
 
the regulation’s plain text”); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (relying on 
the plain text of Title II of the ADA to affirm judgment of the Third Circuit). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991); see also Mara Kent, 
“Forced” vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 23 LAW & INEQ. 95, 97 (2005). 
 13. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 14. 527 U.S. 526 (1999). 
 15. See, e.g., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that “plaintiff’s own testimony may be solely sufficient to establish humiliation or 
mental distress” in a Title VII case); Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 808, 811 
(E.D. Mo. 1982) (holding that an emotional damage award is available in Title VII actions and 
that “such an award may be supported solely on plaintiff’s own testimony”). 
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front pay in the 1991 Act by holding that relief exempt from the monetary caps 
Congress had placed on compensatory and punitive damages.16 
Five years before the 1991 Act, the Court approved Title VII claims based 
not just on “quid pro quo” sexual harassment but on the far more common 
variety of “hostile environment” discrimination.17  At the time, however, the 
only available remedies for the latter type of sexual harassment were 
declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees, which dampened the 
enthusiasm of putative Title VII plaintiffs and their lawyers.  The 1991 Act’s 
authorization of punitive and, especially, compensatory damages spurred a 
huge increase in the number of claims alleging hostile environment sexual 
harassment.18  Had the Court followed its approach in civil rights cases, 
discussed below, it might have been expected to close these “floodgates.”  In 
fact, however, the Court’s post-1991 sexual harassment decisions have been 
generally supportive. 
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., for example, the Court rejected a per se 
circuit court rule that would have required a hostile environment plaintiff to 
demonstrate that employer harassment had “seriously affected 
[her]. . .psychological well-being.”19  Instead, the Court adopted a test that 
asks, from the standpoint of a hypothetical reasonable person, whether the sum 
of gender-related remarks, insults, propositions, conduct and innuendo was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
environment and create abusive working conditions.20  Because the 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive” inquiry framed by the Court is a question of 
degree, it also left room for plaintiffs to argueadmittedly with mixed success 
in the lower federal courtsthat the question was one of fact for a jury.21 
In three 1998 decisions, the Court adopted a flexible, moderately 
accommodative concept of the kind of harassment that meets the statutory 
definition “because of sex.”  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. held 
that the speech or conduct of an employer agent is actionable if undertaken 
because of the plaintiff’s particular gender.22  This is a test that will be met, 
 
 16. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001). 
 17. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 18. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding Employer 
Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 2 n.3 (1999) (observing 
that the 1991 Act’s addition of compensatory and punitive damages has “transformed civil rights 
law into a meaningful vehicle for curtailing hostile environment harassment”). 
 19. 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., McCowan v. All Star Maint, Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 923 (10th Cir. 2001) (treating 
inquiry as a question of fact); Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 245 (7th Cir. 
1999) (treating inquiry as a question of law); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 
1994) (treating inquiry as a question of fact); Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 
1201 (9th Cir. 1991) (treating inquiry as a question of law). 
 22. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
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regardless of whether the employer agent and the plaintiff are of the same sex, 
when factual development reveals that an employer agent manifested hostility 
towards the plaintiff’s gender (or race, religion or national origin) or was 
animated by sexual desire in pursuing the plaintiff.23 
The Court also sketched a surprisingly plaintiff-friendly formula for 
fastening liability on defendant employers for both “tangible terms” and hostile 
environment harassment perpetrated by supervisors, co-employees, suppliers, 
or customers.  In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth24 and Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton,25 the Court announced liability standards that hold defendant 
employers strictly liable for “tangible terms” (formerly “quid pro quo”) 
harassment; for supervisors or managers who condition jobs, pay, or 
promotions on plaintiff’s submission to their sexual demands; and for hostile 
environment harassment by supervisors or co-employees unless they could 
plead and prove a detailed, two-pronged affirmative defense.  Because one of 
these prongs requires the employer to demonstrate that the plaintiff 
unreasonably failed to avail herself of a fair and explicit internal complaints 
procedure maintained by the employer, the employer’s ability to maintain the 
affirmative defense is ultimately beyond own control.26 
Further, the Court adopted a surprisingly lenient approach to Title VII’s 
timely filing requirements in the most common type of harassment case, where 
the law violation is not “discrete” but consists of a series of incidents over 
time.  In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Court authorized 
hostile environment cases to proceed if even one of the incidents constituting 
an alleged pattern of severe or abusive sex or race harassment occurred within 
the Title VII period for filing a timely charge with the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or state antidiscrimination agency.27  In 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the Court allowed the employer the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense in cases where constructive discharge results from a 
“tangible” employment action, such as decisions affecting the plaintiff’s 
position, pay, or promotion.28 
Perhaps the most significant encouragement the Court has lent to the 
amended Title VII is its relaxation of the evidentiary requirements for plaintiffs 
to survive motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.  
The Court’s opinion in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks29 contained 
conflicting passages that left lower courts unsure whether the plaintiff needed 
affirmative evidence of unlawful employer motive to get to a jury, or withstand 
 
 23. Id. at 80–81. 
 24. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 25. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 26. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765. 
 27. 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002). 
 28. 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2355 (2004). 
 29. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
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an attack on a verdict, or if she could present that ultimate question indirectly 
merely with mere “pretext” evidence impeaching or contradicting the 
employer’s asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. In Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., however, the Court resoundingly clarified 
the point, holding that a plaintiff’s verdict should be sustained whenever the 
jury could reasonably find, simply from evidence of the falsity of the 
employer’s asserted reason, that the employer had acted for a reason prohibited 
by statute.30  The opinion also cautioned lower federal courts against 
discounting plaintiffs’ evidence of falsity.31  While Reeves was an ADEA 
decision, the Court made clear that its reasoning also applied to Title VII 
claims.32 At least as significant, the opinion also equated the standard for 
sustaining jury verdicts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, at issue in 
Reeves, with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 summary judgment 
standard.33  It is difficult to imagine a plaintiff’s case worth taking as far as 
federal court in which the plaintiff is unable to offer evidence impeaching or 
contradicting the asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the 
defendant.  Accordingly, if applied straightforwardly by the lower federal 
courts, Reeves had the potential to ensure a trial on the merits for virtually all 
capably presented Title VII cases, thereby reversing one-and-a-half decades of 
federal jurisprudence that had routinely granted or upheld the granting of 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.34 
Unsurprisingly, some lower courts—which, unlike the Supreme Court, 
must actually conduct or regularly review trials—have evaded a literal 
application of Reeves.  One, for example, adds the gloss that the plaintiff’s 
evidence of the falsity of the employer’s asserted legitimate reason must be 
substantial, or at least more than slight.35  Nevertheless, other circuit court 
decisions display fidelity to Reeves.  Its enduring power is perhaps best seen in 
decisions that overturn summary judgment by reference to Reeves’s lenient 
standard even where plaintiff’s evidence of pretext is tested under a stringent 
legal definition of unlawful discrimination.36 
 
 30. 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). 
 31. Id. at 147–48. 
 32. Id. at 142; see also Hinson v. Clinch County, 231 F.3d 821, 827-32 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(applying Reeves to Title VII action). 
 33. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; see also Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 590-92 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (applying Reeves at summary judgment). 
 34. That solicitude dates to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 35. See, e.g., Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(involving ADEA claims); James v. NY Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 154-155 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(same); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). 
 36. See, e.g., Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(reversing summary judgment, citing Reeves, in applying a promotion standard that required 
plaintiff to show that she was so better qualified than the selectee that the discrepancies “jump off 
the page and slap you in the face”). 
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Complementing Reeves is the Court’s unanimous decision in Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa,37 which permits plaintiffs to impose on an unwilling 
defendant a mixed-motive instruction raising the “same-decision” defense, 
even when plaintiff’s prima facie evidence of unlawful discrimination is not 
“direct” but consists of the far more common and readily producible inferential 
showing authorized by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.38  Justice 
Thomas’s opinion for the Court, in explicit reliance on the supposed “plain 
text” of the 1991 amendments to Title VII, upheld the view of the Ninth 
Circuit, thereby rejecting the approach of every other circuit that had decided 
the question.39 
At first blush it would appear that the Court’s willingness to enforce 
individual agreements to arbitrate federal statutory discrimination claims, 
extracted as a “take-it-or-leave-it” condition of initial employment, stands as a 
notable exception to this trend.  The Court initially expressed this support for 
what the EEOC considers involuntary, quasi-compulsory arbitration in an 
ADEA case, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.40  In 2001, in Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court extended the reach of Gilmer by 
upholding the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims 
contained in the vast majority of employment contracts in interstate 
commerce—even where state law purported to preserve a state court forum for 
employment-based claims.41  This is not, however, special hostile treatment of 
Title VII claims.  Rather, the Court’s encouragement of arbitration has long 
taken precedence over virtually all competing considerations, including 
federalism.42 
Indeed, the Court has proceeded rather incrementally in approving the 
arbitration of Title VII claims.  In E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., for example, 
the Court held that the EEOC’s public policy role relieves it from being bound 
by an individual employee’s agreement to arbitrate, enabling the agency to 
recover victim-specific, not just classwide, relief in court.43  Similarly, in 
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., the Court declined an opportunity 
to extend Gilmer to a collectively bargained agreement to arbitrate statutory 
 
 37. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 38. Id. at 101-02.  For a further elaboration of the inferential showing authorized by the 
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, see 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 39. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 98–102. 
 40. 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991). 
 41. 532 U.S. 105, 119, 123-24 (2001) (narrowly interpreting an exception to the Federal 
Arbitration Act as rendering unenforceable only agreements to arbitrate contained in employment 
contracts of employees actually engaged in interstate or foreign transportation). 
 42. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1987) (holding that the Federal 
Arbitration Act preempts California Labor Code provision that wage collection actions are 
maintainable in state court without regard to private agreements to arbitrate). 
 43. 534 U.S. 279, 296-97 (2002). 
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discrimination claims.44  It did not overrule Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co.,45 holding instead that a union’s pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate the 
statutory discrimination claims of its members, and hence to waive their right 
to a judicial forum, is, unlike an agreement to arbitrate contained in an 
individual employment contract, not entitled to a presumption of validity and 
must be clear and unmistakable. 46  Further, the Court has left undisturbed a 
number of arbitration escape hatches devised by the lower federal courts, 
which have invalidated even individual agreements to arbitrate statutory claims 
unless they do the following: plainly describe the claims the employee agrees 
to arbitrate,47 afford a fair measure of the discovery that would ordinarily be 
available in federal court,48 preserve most or all of the federal statutory 
remedies in arbitration,49 and cast a significant part of the cost of arbitrating on 
the employer,50 and  although the Federal Arbitration Act severely restricts 
judicial review, the Court has not expressly decided that de novo litigation is 
foreclosed once arbitration of a federal statutory employment discrimination 
claim is complete. 
In one respect, it is true, the 1991 Amendments shored up Title VII only 
weakly.  In addressing the Court’s 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., 
Inc.  v. Atonio,51 Congress restored the Title VII disproportionate adverse 
impact proof mode for challenging the discriminatory effects of neutral 
practices far more tepidly and ambiguously than they revitalized the standard 
disparate treatment claim we have been considering until now.  Wards Cove 
undermined attacks on neutral practices by stiffening requirements for the 
prima facie evidence that a particular practice caused a specified 
disproportionate adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII, by diluting 
the nature and quantum of the employer’s defense to such a showing, and by 
requiring plaintiffs in rebuttal to identify an alternative practice that would 
serve the employer goals underlying the challenged practice with lesser 
adverse impact on their group.52  The 1991 amendments somewhat alleviated 
these new burdens but only very vaguely.  Most strikingly, Congress asserted 
in a preliminary provision on legislative purpose, and in an interpretive 
memorandum (which it purported to tell the courts was their sole legitimate 
guide to any legislative history related to Wards Cove), that the job-relatedness 
and business necessity defenses an employer must use to justify the 
 
 44. 525 U.S. 70, 82 n.2 (1998). 
 45. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 46. 525 U.S. at 81–82. 
 47. See, e.g., Brisentine v. Stone & Weber Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 48. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 49. See, e.g., Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1059 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 50. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 51. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 52. Id. at 656–61. 
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disproportionate adverse effects of a neutral practice mean what the Supreme 
Court had said such defenses meant in its decisions before Wards Cove.53  The 
calculated ambiguity of this approach lies in the fact that in its pre-Wards Cove 
decisions the Court had articulated widely divergent formulations of those 
defenses.54  In the wake of this conflicted Congressional revision of the Title 
VII neutral practice claim, it is understandable that post-1991 enforcement of 
those claims has been inconsistent and lax.55 
But the main point is underscored by contrasting the Court’s general 
support for Title VII disparate treatment claims since 1991 with its relatively 
indifferent treatment of ADEA claims and its positively frigid response to 
claims under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, particularly § 1983 and 
§ 1985(3).  Significantly, the would-be beneficiaries of those statutes have not 
had effective constituencies in Congress, or at least have not been able to 
mobilize a majority like that which passed the 1991 Act, to reverse the Court’s 
own retrenching tendencies. 
The ADEA suffered in the 1990s from the Court’s not-so-benign neglect.  
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, for example, the Court held that an employer 
does not violate the ADEA by basing its employment decision on a factor other 
than age, even if that factor strongly correlates with age.56The Hazen opinion 
also stated, without supporting authority or reasoning, that the ADEA plaintiff 
must show that age was a “determinative” factor in the adverse employment 
decision.57  This is linguistically, as well as practically, a higher hurdle than the 
Title VII plaintiff’s burden to show that race, sex, religion or national origin 
was a “motivating factor”—language added by the 1991 amendments in an 
apparent attempt to ease the plaintiff’s prima facie case.58 
Further, only Title VII, not the ADEA, was amended to eliminate the 
employer’s ability to escape all liability in mixed-motive cases by proving that 
it would have made the same decision even absent a partial unlawful 
motivation.  Consequently, at least one circuit is assuming that Desert Palace 
does not apply to ADEA claims, so the plaintiff may not foist the same-
decision defense on an unwilling ADEA defendant.59  And this year the Court 
 
 53. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 23–45 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 
561–83. 
 54. For a detailed discussion of the pre-Wards Cove Supreme Court decisions, Wards Cove 
itself, the modifications made by the 1991 amendments in response, and the post-1991 
developments, see HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 327–30 (2d ed. 2004). 
 55. See, e.g., Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 56. 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993). 
 57. Id. at 610. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
 59. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284–85 n.2 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
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held that the neutral practices/disproportionate advance impact theory, while 
available under the ADEA, is narrower in scope that its Title VII counterpart, 
in two significant respects.60 The Court’s specifically relied on Congress’s 
failure in the 1991 amendments to fortify the ADEA neutral-practice claim as 
to some degree it did the counterpart in a claim under Title VII.61  Moreover, 
while numerous decisions confirm that race discrimination under Title VII is a 
two-way street available to white as well as black plaintiffs,62 the Court 
recently held that the ADEA’s ban on discrimination because of age applies 
only when the discrimination is directed against persons over forty who are 
relatively older, not younger, than a comparator.63 
The Court’s consistent antipathy towards constitutional claims under § 
1983, pronounced in the 1980s, only intensified after it went unchecked by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.  From 1982 to 1987, for example, the Court 
famously and radically reformulated the common law doctrine of qualified 
immunity to protect individual government officer defendants against damages 
claims by shielding them from extensive discovery,64 relieving them via 
summary judgment from standing trial except where a judge concluded that a 
reasonable officer would have realized she was violating clearly established 
law,65 and affording the officer an exceptional, interlocutory appeal from the 
denial of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity.66 
When the 1991 amendments made no reference to this § 1983 doctrine, the 
Court applied it with renewed vigor.  True, it later denied qualified immunity 
twice—when a constitutional violation was so obvious that it could be deemed 
clearly established even absent on-point precedent67 and when physical 
punishment was inflicted on prisoners under circumstances the Court 
considered analogous to those condemned by a circuit’s prior decisions.68  
Nevertherless, the Court in 2001 extended to excessive-force situations the 
factual and legal “double reasonableness” protection the Court already had 
conferred in the 1980s on officers claiming qualified immunity in the context 
of probable cause.69  Moreover, in gratuitous dictum in another case, the Court 
wrote flatly that proof of a government official’s subjective intent to harm the 
plaintiff does not forfeit the immunity; it also sketched an elaborate pleading, 
 
 60. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1544–45 (2005). 
 61. Id. at 1545. 
 62. The Court itself so held in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279–
80 (1976). 
 63. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004). 
 64. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 65. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 632, 646 (1987); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 66. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517, 530 (1985). 
 67. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71 (1997). 
 68. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741–42 (2002). 
 69. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203–05 (2001). 
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discovery, and summary judgment blueprint for individual government 
defendants who claim it.70  Finally, the Court amplified the pre-1990 
availability of interlocutory appeal by holding that a government official 
whose summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity was twice 
denied on legal or quasi-legal grounds might make two successive 
interlocutory appeals. 71 
The same pattern may be observed with § 1983 claims against government 
entities.  In recognizing those claims for the first time in 1978, the Supreme 
Court, concerned about opening the floodgates, limited those claims to 
situations where the government agent subjected the plaintiff to a 
constitutional violation through the implementation of the entity’s official 
“policy.”72  The Court applied this concept with increasing severity in a series 
of decisions in the late 1980s.73  When the 1991 Amendments to Title VII 
made no mention of these restrictions on the use of § 1983, the Court 
continued to apply and even expand them.74 
Section 1985(3) was even more thoroughly eviscerated after Congress 
failed to revive it in the 1991 Act.  In an early 1980s decision, the Court 
mentioned a principle that, if applied generally, would render § 1985(3) a 
virtual nullity in actions against private defendants: The only actionable 
private-party conspiracies would be those aimed at depriving plaintiffs of the 
very few constitutional rights protected against private, as well as 
governmental, invasion.75  By 1993 the Court relied on that principle directly, 
clarifying that § 1985(3) private-defendant conspiracies are actionable only 
where the defendants seek to subject persons to involuntary servitude or 
deprive them of the limited right to interstate travel.76 
The importance of legislative text that the federal judiciary deems “plain” 
is perhaps most vividly revealed by the post-1991 status of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
the Reconstruction Act statute most used in employment cases.  The 1991 
Amendments addressed two of the § 1981 decisions in the Supreme Court’s 
1989 trilogy, Patterson v. McClean Credit Union77 and Jett v. Dallas 
Independent School District,78  but they used significantly clearer language in 
 
 70. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592–93, 597–601 (1998). 
 71. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996). 
 72. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). 
 73. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (adopting the Monell holding 
in a plurality opinion); see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738 (1989) 
(adopting the Praprotnik rule as a majority holding); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 
385–86 (1989). 
 74. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 
 75. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1983). 
 76. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993). 
 77. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
 78. 491 U.S. 701 (1989). 
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overruling the former.  The lower federal court decisions in the years that 
followed reflect the difference starkly. 
Patterson, for example, held that the § 1981 prohibition on racial or ethnic 
discrimination in the “making” and “enforcement” of private employment 
contracts does not extend to conduct occurring after the employment relation is 
established.79  The Court thus made the statute unavailable for complaints 
about any kind of “postformation conduct,” that is to say conditions of 
continuing employment after initial hire including promotions, discharges, 
harassment, and retaliation.80  Section 101 of the 1991 Act specifically 
overruled Patterson by adding to § 1981 the following new subparagraph: 
“[f]or purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes 
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship.”81 
In the ensuing years, lower federal courts have agreed that this sweeping 
text effectively restores § 1981 to its pre-Patterson status by applying its ban 
on race-based contract discrimination to the full range of terms and conditions 
of employment protected by Title VII.82  While the Supreme Court has seldom 
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 since the 1991 Amendments overruled Patterson, 
it recently relied on the “plain text” of a different statute to apply a generous 
national four-year period of limitations to most § 1981 claims.83 
Jett, on the other hand, had limited governmental liability under § 1981 to 
circumstances that would also result in liability under the more stringent 
standards of § 1983—including, most notably, the stricture that local 
government is liable for only those acts of its agents undertaken in fulfillment 
of the agency’s official policy.84  In § 101 of the 1991 Act, Congress 
responded ambiguously, adding to § 1981 the following new subparagraph: 
“[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against impairment . . . 
under color of State law.”85  This language does confirm the Jett premise that 
the § 1981 right to be free of race discrimination in contracting is enforceable 
against local government.  The text, however, fails to deal directly with the Jett 
holding that, in order to enforce this § 1981 right, plaintiffs suing government, 
 
 79. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176–78. 
 80. Id. at 180–81. 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000). 
 82. See, e.g., Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 324 F.3d 310, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that the 1991 Act restored a § 1981 claim of retaliation); Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 
F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that, as amended, § 1981 reaches claims of unlawful 
retaliation, harassment, and discrimination in demotion, promotion, transfer and discharge, as 
well as hiring). 
 83. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S.Ct. 1836, 1840, 1845 (2004). 
 84. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735–38 (1989). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (2000). 
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unlike private defendants, must establish the additional elements of liability 
under required § 1983.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, after some initial confusion, 
the few federal circuit courts to address the issue have all held that subsection 
(c) does not effectively overrule Jett.86  As a consequence, plaintiffs in search 
of a federal statutory remedy for race discrimination in employment against 
local government are relegated to Title VII, with all of its restrictive procedural 
prerequisites and caps on damages.  Section 1981, with its immediate access to 
court and uncapped damages, remains unavailable as an additional tool in the 
arsenal against government defendants. 
In brief, the history of Title VII after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
especially when viewed against the less favorable judicial treatment of 
companion employment statutes that the 1991 Act ignored or failed to 
reinvigorate with clarity, suggests that the Rehnquist Court has put its “plain 
text” mantra into practice.  If this conclusion is correct, it might somewhat 
restore the faith of academic and public interest group critics that the Court is 
discharging its role as elaborator of legislative meaning legitimately.  Certainly 
our tradition leaves room for the justices of the Supreme Court to imbue 
ambiguous statutory text with meanings that reflect their own predispositions 
and preferences—that is inherent in the nature of the Presidential appointment 
power.  What we can minimally ask of the Court is that where a constituency, 
like employed persons, is sufficiently potent to extract from Congress 
relatively determinate statutory text, the Justices will give Congress its due.  In 
interpreting Title VII after the 1991 Amendments, the Court appears to have 
done so. 
Of course this ultimately subjects potential claimants to the tender mercies 
of Congress, which must speak on their behalf and speak plainly.  Woe betide 
the group—like prisoners—that is unable to assemble an effective legislative 
constituency.87  One may well lament that Congressional will has been 
mobilized in the last two decades for only selective reinvigoration of the 
employment discrimination statutes.  One may lament even more that Congress 
has not come to the aid of civil rights claimants at all.  One may also lament 
that the Rehnquist Court, left by Congress to its own devices, has so 
sedulously, strenuously, and severely shredded enforcement of the 
 
 86. See Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 481–82 (5th Cir. 2002); Butts v. County of Volusia, 
222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000); Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 n.1 (4th Cir. 
1995); Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 224 (8th Cir. 1994) (continuing 
to follow Jett).  Similar in practical effect is Federation of African American Contractors v. City 
of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1216 (9th Cir. 1996), holding that § 1981 provides both a right and a 
remedy against local government but that municipal liability under that statute must be 
determined by reference to the additional § 1983 element of policy. 
 87. In Crawford-El v. Britton, the Court catalogues the several significant impediments 
Congress placed in the path of prisoners’ civil suits in the Prison Litigation Reform Act.  523 U.S. 
574, 596–97 (1998). 
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Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, particularly § 1983.  Those are, however, 
natural byproducts of the cultural and social tides that have driven our electoral 
and judicial appointment politics, byproducts not curable by any theory of 
statutory interpretation that has gained widespread acceptance in a democratic 
republic.  To give the Court its due, our glimpse at the post-1991 history of 
Title VII suggests that when Congress has reasserted itself in plain terms on 
the side of employment discrimination claimants, the federal judiciary has 
come to heel, even in the face of its own contrary predilections. 
 
